













The objective of this paper is to analyse the effect of professional, technical and 
relational background (human and social capital) of outside directors on promoting firm 
CSR disclosure. Following the Hillman et al. (2000) taxonomy of board members, we 
classify outside directors as business experts, support specialists and community 
influentials, and examine whether business and technical expertise or political ties in the 
boardroom affect CSR disclosure.  
This study confirms that not all outside directors are equally effective in 
improving CSR disclosure and that only certain kinds of outside directors, those classified 
as support specialists, help increase it. On the other hand, our findings also show that 
directors with previous experience as politicians affect CSR disclosure negatively, 
probably due to their interests in safeguarding their reputation within the company against 
public scrutiny and in protecting their political connections. In addition, our set of analysis 
with interaction effects reveals that powerful CEOs have the incentive to promote CSR-
related strategies and to press business expert and support specialist directors to enhance 
profitable sustainability strategies and transparency in its disclosure. Nevertheless, 
powerful CEO effect is not enough to compensate the negative role of political directors 
on CSR reporting. Therefore, this paper supports the theories that appeal for analysing 
the multiple configurations of corporate governance mechanisms by adopting a “holistic 
approach” and the need to combine them in order to analyse their impact on CSR 
behaviour. 
 






Through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure companies improve 
corporate transparency by reporting not only financial information, but also their social 
and environmental performances to stakeholders and society (e.g., Aribi and Gao, 2010). 
CSR disclosure may allow firms to develop and enhance their corporate image and to 
provide useful information for investment and non-investment decisions (e.g., Deegan 
and Blomquist, 2006). In this way, companies whose boards support CSR reporting will 
show a more social orientation and a more engagement with stakeholders and society by 
satisfying their needs and demands of receiving social and environmental information.  
The analysis of the association between the professional background of board 
members and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure is highly relevant in a 
world of continual governance scandals, failures, opacity, and social and environmental 
excesses (Jain and Jamali, 2016). According to Michelon and Parbonetti (2012), because 
disclosure policies emanate from boards of directors, sustainability disclosure can be 
conditioned by board attributes. Therefore, previous literature has evaluated the effect of 
board composition on CSR ratings, studying the influence of board structure 
characteristics such as independence, interlocking or gender diversity (Cuadrado-
Ballesteros, Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez, 2017; Shaukat et al., 2016; Bear et al., 
2010). A significant limitation of this literature is that these papers adopt a traditional and 
short-sighted perspective of board composition and assume homogeneity in skills and 
abilities in the boardroom, which leads to an incomplete analysis of the level of expertise 
that actually exists on the board and its consequences (Gray and Nowland, 2013).  
This paper advances this stream of literature by analysing the effect of professional, 
technical and relational background on promoting firm CSR disclosure. These resources 
represent the board capital (human and social) as they refer to knowledge, skills, networks 
and ties (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). We use the board director classification of Hillman 
et al. (2000), who develop board capital and classify board outside directors as business 
experts, support specialists, and community influentials. These dimensions, previously 
used by other authors (Markarian and Parbonetti, 2007; Jones, Makri and Gomez-Mejia, 
2008; Bear, Rahman and Post, 2010; Haynes and Hillman, 2010), allow us to examine a 
comprehensive and broad range of board characteristics. We exploit this literature by 
arguing that boards with a higher proportion of business experts and support specialists 
are expected to be more effective in encouraging CSR reporting. Into the broad Hillman 
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category of community influential, we differentiate directors with political connections 
and expect a negative influence on CSR. As an analysis extension, we study whether the 
effect of board composition on CSR reporting is moderated by powerful CEOs. In this 
vein, we follow Jain and Jamali (2016), who state that scholars are required to adopt a 
holistic approach where CEO power and board interact to form bundles that in turn 
influence CSR outcomes.  
We examine a sample of Spanish listed firms during the 2008–2014 period. Spain is 
an interesting country to analyse board composition due to several reasons. First, the 
recent Good Governance Code of Spanish Listed Companies (2015) recommends that 
firms should have a diverse board in skills and background and states that the director 
selection policy should look for a balance of knowledge and experience in boardrooms. 
Second, in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon capital markets, the board of directors in Spain is 
the prevalent mechanism of control (García-Meca et al., 2015). Finally, in Spanish 
boardrooms, it is noticeable the high number of directors with political connections, 
mainly explained by the number of privatizations made in Spain during the last decades 
and the high ownership concentration (Bona-Sánchez et al., 2014). Previous papers have 
examined the influence of boards in CSR disclosure of Spanish firms (e.g. García-Meca 
and Pucheta, 2017; Cabeza-García et al., 2017), but none of them has used the Hillman 
taxonomy to study how the human and social capital of directors can contribute to CSR 
disclosure.  
The paper contributes to the literature focused on directors from the perspective of 
the resource dependence theory, by supporting the assumptions that boards provide 
critical resources to the firm, including professional (business experts), technical (support 
specialists) and relational (community influential) background as a way to influence firm 
CSR disclosure. Therefore, we contribute to the emerging stream of behavioural 
governance by noting that individual differences in personal styles, skills, ties and 
business knowledge between business experts, support specialists and community 
influentials can lead them to make different choices that affect corporate decisions 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984). This paper is also the first empirical paper which tests the 
“board human and social capital” effect on promoting CSR disclosure, providing an 
answer to the recent call for further research on examining the knowledge and experiential 
diversity of boards which can significantly impact CSR outcomes (Jain and Jamali, 2016). 
According to the recent revision of governance studies published by Filatotchev and 
Wright (2017), studies that analyse board composition are usually too simplistic and fail 
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to examine the human and social capital of boards that is important for both monitoring 
and adding value. Finally, this is the first paper to test the connections between different 
board member categories, CSR reporting and CEO power. Our results are consistent with 
the trend in literature that suggests the interdependency among corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Theoretical framework 
Drawing on resource dependence perspective, prior research (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) explores the effect of 
several board attributes on CSR reporting. A complete revision of past literature 
examining the association between board characteristics and CSR activities is done by 
Jain and Jamali (2016). They note that among boardroom attributes, human and social 
capital is crucial to improve CSR engagement (e.g., Wincent et al., 2010; Tian et al., 
2011). According to Hillman and Dalziel (2003) and Haynes and Hillman (2010), board 
members may become providers of these two kinds of capital. Thus, when board directors 
provide skills and knowledge to boards, they will be allocating human capital, while that 
board directors will allocate social capital when providing abilities to obtain resources 
and maintain relationships with external environments or organizations. In this regard, 
Russo and Fouts (1997) also highlight “the importance of nurturing and building 
resources through sustained actions for creating and maintaining a pro-environmental 
internal capabilities and external reputation” and Hart (1995) states that for companies 
willing to maintain their competitive advantages concerning social and environmental 
matters, “it is important to consistently build upon their internal human and organizational 
competencies and resources, as these may otherwise erode over time as competitors catch 
up”. 
Resource dependence approach also supports the view that boards become a 
relevant mechanism for providing outside resources and for maintaining external relations 
with influential’s organizations. In this regard, board of directors is an important resource 
for handling firm external needs like environmental and social challenges. Board 
members, according to resource dependence theory, become more effective when 
providing resources to companies like abilities, knowledge, experience, advice, 
legitimacy, reputation, assistance in achieving commitment and external links between 
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firms and significant stakeholders or other relevant organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978), which may affect the role played by directors to monitor managers, to advise firms 
and to make decisions. Boards with this human and social capital are more likely to 
develop their tasks and duties in a more efficient way. Under this perspective, a board 
made up by directors with diversity of links, experience, abilities and knowledge and with 
a wider stakeholder perspective may affect positively CSR strategic decisions such as the 
reporting of CSR matters (e.g., Wang and Dwhirst, 1992). According to Dass et al. (2014), 
resource dependence approach also suggests the relevant advice role that boards might 
perform when their members possess reputation, expertise in different areas and 
influences. Thus, board structure will be shaped according to firm’s needs for relevant 
external ties (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Individual board members provide boards 
individual experience, different contributions and other firms expertise (Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985). Furthermore, outsiders, apart from supervising managers, also bring 
experience and resources for handling matters coming from outside such as ties with 
external firms, helpful experience and advise, legitimacy and support or commitment 
from external agents (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
In order to survive and gain competitive advantages toward their competitors, 
firms should appoint board members who are able to satisfy demands from influent and 
relevant externals organizations. Diverse directorships have benefits for companies in 
terms of enriching experience and reinforcing knowledge and business links with 
outsiders (e.g., Harris and Shimizu, 2004). Terjesen et al. (2016) also claim that human 
capital (individual expertise, abilities or background) on boards might improve the 
decision-making process of firms because there will be a higher flow of information 
between board directors. Consequently, the connections with outside organizations and 
stakeholders can be strengthened, encouraging the reporting of CSR matters.  
 
Hypotheses development 
Prior expertise and background of board of directors become equal or more 
relevant than board independence or non-CEO duality (Gul and Leung, 2004). In this 
respect, Hillman et al. (2000) give a step and classify external directors into three groups: 
business experts, support specialists and community influentials.  
According to Hillman et al. (2000), business experts are those board members who 
have knowledge based on their previous experience as executives of other firms. They 
provide abilities, skills and knowledge acquired previously in other organisations as 
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insiders or executives. This past expertise in several firm’s areas when these directors 
were developing executives tasks in other companies will have positive effects on firms, 
particularly on the decision-making process. Additionally, business experts can 
contribute with new perspectives coming from other environments concerning internal 
matters and markets as well as, according to Zahra and Pearce (1989) and Bear et al. 
(2010), being able to provide useful resources for firm activities and obtaining relevant 
connections with external agents such as boards and other significant stakeholders from 
crucial companies. Therefore, business experts will be able to bring human and social 
capital to boards, useful for all board members when non-financial and non-business 
decisions, such as CSR reporting, have to be made. This human and social capital comes 
from the education, knowledge and expertise acquired by these directors outside of the 
company (e.g., Wincent et al. 2010). Board members with these qualities will have a 
higher ability for processing information, for being involved with companies’ strategies, 
for creating networks, for being more receptive to innovation and for supporting effective 
decision-making (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Goll et al., 2007; Wincent et al., 2009). 
Thus, board directors with these characteristics will be more likely to develop their roles 
of service, control and provision of resources with positive effects on companies.  
The appointment of business experts on boards may be positively appreciated by 
shareholders and several stakeholders, given their prior executive experience in similar 
sectors. Then, they may contribute to make relevant strategic decisions for their better-
quality skills, because may detect threats and opportunities and because the background 
acquired in linked industries might bring information of quality to share with other board 
members (Jones et al., 2008; Dass et al. 2014; Faleye et al., 2014). This will improve 
board effectiveness since board members will be able to play an enhanced supervising 
role. 
According to resource dependence theory, board members with diverse 
background and executive experience show a higher level of social and human capital, as 
well as having a positive effect on the relationships between board members and 
managers, which in turn may encourage CSR activities (e.g., Shropshire, 2010; Westphal, 
1999). Ben Barka and Dardour (2015) show a positive association between board 
members with experience and skills and corporate social/environmental performance. 
Finkelstein et al. (2009) also argue that the educational background of executives will 
define their social orientation. In this regard, executives who have gained degrees relative 
to social and human sciences, for instance, will be more likely to engage with 
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stakeholders’ needs and, consequently, they will be more proactive in disclosing CSR 
issues. Business experts may also contribute towards making relevant strategic decisions 
due to their higher level of skills, because they may better detect threats and opportunities, 
and because their background acquired in related industries might bring quality 
information which they can share with other board members (Dass et al., 2014; Faleye et 
al., 2014; Jones et al., 2008). Therefore, the human and social capital supplied by business 
experts on boards may define the board’s CSR orientation. 
Prior empirical literature shows that investment in innovation (Faleye et al., 2014) 
or corporate value (e.g. Drobetz et al., 2014) is positively affected by business experts on 
boards. Furthermore, Thomas and Simerly (1995) provide evidence that managers with 
prior expertise and knowledge acquired in other organisations show more sensitivity 
towards stakeholders’ needs and those CSR matters which firms may face. Gray and 
Nowland (2017) demonstrated that firms whose boards are composed of directors with 
prior business expertise in other companies and who have worked as directors on boards 
of different firms had a positive effect on market reaction. Additionally, Mallin and 
Michelon (2011), focusing on resource dependence theory, propose that external directors 
with a diversity of capabilities, external links, skills and advice on stakeholders’ 
expectations can be considered as providers of social and human capital and, thereby, 
may improve their credibility and CSR reporting, strengthening ties with companies’ 
stakeholders.  
Thus, based on the above arguments, we posit the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: Business expert directors on boards have a positive impact on CSR reporting. 
 
In comparison to business experts, who are regarded as decision monitors by Jones 
et al. (2008), among others, support specialist directors are deemed as decision supporters 
who bring specific expertise and knowledge to areas such as insurance, law, technology, 
industries and capital markets (e.g., Shaukat et al., 2016), amongst other things, which 
may have a positive effect on strategic activities and decisions. In this regard, Hillman et 
al. (2000) describe support specialists as directors serving on boards who provide 
expertise acquired as officers or executives in commercial and investment banks, 
accounting, auditing and consulting firms, law companies and advertising firms. This 
specialized know-how may help managers in particular matters with which they are not 
familiar, because support specialists will be able to advise them and contribute with 
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specific abilities, skills and experience when making strategic decisions (Hillman et al., 
2000), which might have a positive effect on the whole business deals of companies. 
However, support specialists on boards do not tend to possess as much general experience 
in management matters (Hillman et al., 2000; Baysinger and Zardkoohi, 1986) as business 
experts do.  
Support specialists also become significant suppliers of social and human capital 
to boards, due to their particular knowledge and expertise in different areas of the firm 
and due to their external connections, which aid companies in obtaining support from 
outside organisations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This view is supported by Bear et al. 
(2010), who state that support specialists maintain ties with clients’ networks, their main 
companies and professional organisations. The different external links and networks may 
result in a higher support from external agents, in a higher knowledge of the context where 
the firm operates and in a higher response to the demands and needs of stakeholders. As 
Beckman and Haunschild (2002) argue, all the networks might supply experience, 
counsel and relations that promote alliance and mutual aid with crucial stakeholders. 
Firms might enhance the relations with their stakeholders if they voluntarily disclose CSR 
information and may be perceived as more socially responsible. Thus, directors (support 
specialists) with attributes such as particular background and connections with outside 
organizations that may allocate expertise, advice and support will be more likely to 
support decisions involving social and environmental issues in order to satisfy 
shareholders’ and stakeholders’ needs by engaging with the reporting of CSR matters. 
This idea is supported by Nikolova and Arsi (2017), who pose that “CSR cannot exist if 
individuals do not possess enough maturity and competence to act responsibly. It is up to 
companies to train and for society to socialize the individuals towards the development 
of such necessary competencies”.  
Authors such as Kroll et al. (2008) and Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009), among 
others, report that directors who possess specific expertise related to the industry where 
the company operates, will bring to the board solid information on the competitive 
environment of the company and on the way that the industry works and, consequently, 
their knowledge and advice will benefit managers.	 Furthermore, this particular and 
technical knowledge of the industry will allow directors to identify new industry’s 
opportunities, to assess growth’s schemes proposed by managers and to access to vital 
resources for their external connections, providing social and human capital to boards.  
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The capital of supporter specialists may play a relevant role on boards due to the 
wide benefits that firms might gain from it. Galbreath (2016, 2009) also supports the idea 
that support specialists possess expertise in formulating strategies which are not related 
to business and markets, and Helfaya and Moussa (2017) noted that audit committee 
directors with financial expertise had a positive impact on environmental and 
sustainability disclosure of UK firms. Given that CSR activities are more associated with 
environmental and social matters than financial, board members who provide a unique 
knowledge, skills and expertise acquired in other organizations might bring improved 
social and human capital to boards to address CSR issues. These individuals have highly 
developed their human skills and, therefore, they will be more conscious of their own 
behaviours, beliefs and perceptions on other groups and individuals. In line with Ewert 
and Baker (2001), apart from formal education, academic major or specialization of board 
directors is involved with their general motivations, beliefs, perspectives and values. 
According to these authors, the academic major affects the several levels of a person’s 
environmental worries and attitude toward environmental issues. In this way, these 
directors might accept that others have different assumptions, opinions, perspectives and 
beliefs. Accordingly, they may be more sensitive to the motivations and the needs of 
others and might be willing to behave in line with taking into account the perceptions, 
needs and demands of others. As a consequence, they may increase their feeling in the 
direction of society and stakeholders’ interest, which may result in a higher engagement 
and commitment with CSR disclosure. Thus, directors with specific abilities and 
backgrounds also tend to be more involved with the needs of others and to be more 
sensitive towards social and environmental demands and, therefore, these board members 
will make more efficient CSR decisions, such as CSR reporting (Knonrad et al., 2006; 
Rosener, 1995).  
To sum up, support specialists become significant board members, especially from 
the beginning of the worldwide financial crisis, because shareholders, stakeholders and 
society, in general, claim that most of board members have scant specific background, 
knowledge and qualifications for serving as directors. As a result, the majority of these 
agents blames to the lack or poor specific technical knowledge of directors of the financial 
frauds, bankruptcy of firms or loss of credibility of capital markets and investors. 
According to the above arguments, we predict that the specific qualifications, 
abilities and technical knowledge of support specialists will have a positive impact on 




H2: Support specialists on boards have a positive effect on CSR reporting. 
 
Community influentials or community leaders play a significant role when serving 
as board directors because they provide support to companies through networking and 
also bring reputation and credibility. Most of the strategic activities and choices of 
companies have an effect on the community or non-business organisations, which have 
ties with community influentials who also possess expertise, skills, abilities and influence 
(Hillman et al., 2000). Among these communities or organisations, officers of 
communities or social organisations, or representatives of universities or other institutions 
like political parties can be emphasised. In this vein, many ex-politicians hold a 
directorship on firms. According to Li et al. (2008), the majority of community 
influentials are directors who have previously been politicians or renowned members in 
relevant communities and are therefore admired and respected and have power in non-
profit contexts.  
Braiotta and Sommer (1987) argue that the presence of community influentials’ 
directors on boards tend to be high because they do not need to have technical 
qualifications or financial, accounting and business experience, as it would be expected 
for members who compose specialized board subcommittees like financial or audit 
committees. This lack of specific expertise, technical knowledge and background may 
justify the great appointment of community influentials’ directors on boards. This idea is 
also supported by Peterson and Philpot (2007), who drawn on resource dependence 
theory, show that the representativeness of community influentials’ directors on boards 
is high. These ideas suggest that community influentials are not appointed by providing 
resources as their background, experience or specific knowledge on certain matters, for 
instance, but by allocating other resources such as external links with relevant 
communities and organisations, which are also important for having competitive 
advantages, for getting significant resources and for surviving.  
Thus, community influentials, when holding a directorship on boards, are 
providers of legitimacy, reputation and credibility and have significant external 
connections for the significant organisations that they represent or have represented. 
These outside links will allow firms to enhance the opportunities to have contacts with 
powerful individuals in the institutional context, which might lead to access to financial 
support, relevant information or other important resources. Furthermore, the external 
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connections of community influentials might be beneficial for firms in order to survive 
and have success since their operations will be better accepted by external communities 
or organizations (Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). According to 
Westphal (1999), community influentials on boards can give advice and guide to 
management team, due to their field of expertise as community leaders.  
Consistent with Hillman et al. (2000) and Hillman and Keim (2001), Yekini et al. 
(2015) argue that companies which have to face uncertain environments will tend to 
appoint community influentials’ directors on boards as a strategic move. In this way, non-
profit or non-business opinions and experiences will be shared among board members 
and boards might use the influence of these directors on several communities. Michelon 
and Parbonetti (2012) claim that community influential directors have a higher orientation 
toward social issues, due to most of them are top executives from non-profit or the 
military organizations, well-known academics and scientists and politicians and, as a 
result, they are more likely to affect positively CSR disclosure. Mallin et al. (2013) 
support this idea since they demonstrate the positive impact of community influential on 
all types of disclosure analysed, among them, CSR reporting. Hillman and Kein (2001) 
also show that community influentials affect positively firm value. Thus, the social and 
human capital, particularly social, supplied by community influentials might play a more 
social role, orienting boards toward social issues such as the reporting of CSR 
information.  
On the other hand, most community leaders, particularly in the Spanish context, 
are characterised by maintaining political connections or by being ex-politicians. 
Therefore, this might negatively influence the opinion of shareholders and stakeholders 
with regards to the firm, since politicians are sometimes reviled and stigmatized by 
society in general. These negative opinions on politicians or ex-politicians are due, in 
part, to corruption scandals, particularly in periods of economic crisis, and because they 
benefit or have benefited themselves to the detriment of citizens’ interests and needs. 
Chen et al. (2011) claim that firms operating in institutional contexts where there have 
been a large number of corruption scandals and which have weak legal systems tend to 
appoint more community influential directors with political connections. Accordingly, 
community influential directors with political ties may be interested in achieving their 
own aims by using political resources to the detriment of shareholders’ and stakeholders’ 
needs. This leads community leaders to disclose, as Bona-Sanchez et al. (2014) suggest, 
less information to third parties in order to safeguard their reputation as politicians or ex-
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politicians within the company against public scrutiny, to protect their political 
connections, and also to avoid reporting competitive advantages to their rivals. As a 
result, the presence of community influentials on boards may have a negative effect on 
CSR disclosure; that is, directors with political ties will be less likely to report CSR 
matters in order to prevent rivals from discovering the companies’ strategies (information 
effect) and to avoid that reported information may transmit a negative opinion about them 
to stakeholders and society (reputational effect). In this last case, whether firms 
voluntarily report CSR information, stakeholders and society will be more conscious on 
all their CSR practices. Stakeholders with high ethical standards, for instance, may be 
potential readers of this CSR information. Accordingly, when they read this information, 
they might perceive it negatively if its reporting has been encouraged by directors with 
political ties o ex-politician serving on boards, particularly if some information stresses 
the ethical attitude of companies, given that the ethical behaviour of these directors is 
questioned. Similar examples are provided by Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) and Griffin 
and Sun (2018), who explore the association between religious affiliations and CSR 
disclosure. Past research (Chaney et al., 2011; Boubakri et al., 2008) finds a negative 
association between political ties and corporate value. Additionally, Bona-Sanchez et al. 
(2014) also show that Spanish companies with politicians on their boards reduce earnings 
informativeness.  
Therefore, taking into account above premises, we hypothesise that the group of 
community influential’ directors is not homogeneous concerning its impact on CSR 
disclosure. In this regard, we expect that CSR reporting will be affected differently by 
political directors and the remainder of community influentials’ directors such as 
influential members in non-profit firms or cleric communities. So, we predict the directors 
with political connections will be less likely to report CSR information, while the rest of 
community influentials’ directors will have a positive effect. Thus, we differentiate 
among the group of community influentials directors between directors who have 
political links or are ex-politicians and the remainder of community influentials directors. 
To the best of our knowledge, in the Spanish context there is no past research focused on 
examining the association between the presence of community influentials’ directors and 
CSR reporting, specifically splitting up the community influentials collective between 
political directors and the rest of community influentials. In view of that, we propose the 




H3a: Directors on boards who were politician or have currently political ties have 
a negative effect on CSR reporting. 
H3b: The remainder of community influential directors on boards have a positive 




The moderating role of CEO power 
The holistic approach highlights the need to consider the multiple relationships 
that exist among the different firm governance dimensions. In this sense, corporate 
governance scholars are required to take a holistic approach where CEO and board 
interact to form bundles that in turn influence CSR disclosure (Jain and Jamali, 2016). 
The moderating role of CEO power is supported by Chen (2014), who suggests that 
research which aims to examine the resource dependence role of board capital in 
influencing R&D investment should consider the potential moderating role of CEO 
power. In the same vein, Haynes and Hillman (2010) also show that CEO power is an 
important moderator of the relationship between board capital and strategic change.	This 
moderating effect is even more important in contexts like Spain, where there is a high 
power distance culture, what means that hierarchy is highly important and most of the 
decisions are centralized in the CEO. 
Literature regarding the CEO power effect on firm outcomes is not homogeneous 
(Rhoades et al., 2001). The agency approach suggests that CEO power increases the 
concentration of managerial power, which can weaken the monitoring and advisory role 
of directors and, thus, reduce CSR investments and the transparency of firm information. 
Therefore, powerful CEOs can make decisions that do not take into account the greater 
interests of stakeholders, reducing their boards’ involvement in social and environmental 
activities as well as the disclosure of these activities (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012).  
On the other hand, another stream of literature holds that powerful CEOs have the 
incentive to promote CSR-related strategies and to press directors to enhance profitable 
sustainability strategies and transparency in its disclosure. According to this literature, 
the CSR engagement and promotion of CSR strategies by directors can be conditioned by 
the CEO incentives to perform these tasks (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Therefore, board 
capital can be more likely to promote CSR activities when there is a powerful CEO in the 
firm. Hence, non-monetary CEO incentives related to career concerns, reputation, 
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entrenchment and power may have a positive influence on board attitude towards CSR 
decisions (Fabrizi et al., 2014; Jiraporn et al., 2015). Accordingly, powerful CEOs can 
reinforce the role of human and social board capital and push for more CSR disclosure, 
which aims to raise long-term profit and performance, as well as to reinforce their 
legitimacy in the eyes of the shareholders. According to Chen et al (2014), powerful CEO 
can also affect the nomination process and, therefore, they condition the loyalty and social 
obligation that directors feel when they are appointed by the current CEO. In addition, 
the implementation of entrenchment activities by CEOs can also increase the involvement 
of CSR activities to compensate for the damage suffered by shareholders as a result of 
self-entrenchment strategies (Prior et al., 2008).  
The moderating role of powerful CEO on the association between boards and firm 
outcomes was already shown by Chen (2014), who found that directors with human and 
social capital tend to support R&D investments when powerful CEOs are present. In 
Spain, Godos-Díez et al. (2014) evidenced that the influence of large shareholders on 
CSR activities was moderated by the CEO profile, noting that Spanish large owners 
interested in CSR were more likely to achieve their objectives if the CEO is closer to the 
steward model and he/she behaved collectively in the interests of all the stakeholders. 
According to the above arguments, we suggest that powerful CEO and board 
members interact to form bundles which in turn affect CSR reporting. Therefore, we posit 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: The effect of business experts, support specialists and community influentials 
on CSR reporting is moderated by powerful CEOs. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
The study sample is comprised of an unbalanced panel of 152 non-financial firms 
listed on the Spanish stock market during the 2008–2014 period. The Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) is the most trustworthy and comprehensive reporting tool used by 
companies for disclosing sustainability information (Brown et al., 2009). Companies 
voluntarily disclose their annual GRI reports on the GRI website, so the information about 
CSR is collected from here as well as from the companies’ websites. Financial and 
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accounting information comes from the SABI1 database, which is comprised of general 
information and data from the financial statements included in the Spanish Companies 
Registration Office. Board characteristics are hand-collected not only from the website 
of the National Securities Market Commission (CNMV), but also from the corporate 




Dependent variable: Measure of Corporate Social Responsibility  
In order to find an appropriate measure for CSR disclosure, we have created an 
index based on the content analysis technique on the CSR reports to quantify the amount 
of CSR information in the reports. This technique is a method of grouping the text of the 
reports into several categories (Kuo et al., 2012; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009). Therefore, 
the CSR disclosure index is the aggregation of the six following items measured as 
dummy variables (García-Meca and Pucheta-Martínez, 2017; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 
2009): (1) CSR information disclosure, which shows if companies disclose any social, 
environmental and economic information; (2) informal preparation of CSR report, where 
firms, besides using the GRI format, give information in other ways; (3) GRI format, 
where companies disclose the CSR information using the GRI format; (4) GRI 
certification, where the CSR report is certified by the GRI; (5) audited CSR report, which 
informs us of whether the CSR information is audited by an external and independent 
entity and (6) assurance of CSR report, which shows if the assurance scope refers to the 
entire CSR report.  
When facing to binary information, as it is our case, indicators can only measure 
the quantity of disclosure, but they ignore the quality of the information (Leitoniene and 
Sapkauskiene, 2015). However, some items that we have included to create the index, 
such as if the CSR information is audited by an external and independent entity, allows 
companies to enhance the quality and reliability of the information provided and enhance 
the stakeholders’ engagement process. 
 
Independent and control variables 
																																								 																				
1 Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System, provided by Bureau Van Dyck Electronic Publishing database. 




As independent variables, we use the proportion of outsiders classified as Business 
Expert (BE), Support Specialist (SS) and Community Influential (CI) over the board size. 
BE are active or retired executives from other firms, with experience in strategic decision-
making in different companies, their main goal being to provide not only their expertise, 
but also their knowledge, advice and alternative viewpoints about internal concerns 
(Markarian and Parbonetti, 2007; Hillman et al., 2000). Outsiders classified as SS are 
professionals specialized in diverse fields (law, capital markets, insurance, public 
relations and industrial knowledge, among others) and who provide companies with their 
expertise and knowledge in their individual specialized field (Hillman et al., 2000). The 
CI group is made up of non-executive directors such as politicians, members of the clergy, 
and leaders of social organizations that provide networking and reputation opportunities 
to the company (Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000). Since it is rather common to find 
former politicians on the boards of the largest firms in Spain (Goldman et al., 2009, 
Faccio, 2006), we have divided the CI members	into two groups. The CI_pol includes the 
proportion of politicians classified as community influential, while the CI_others is made 
up of the remaining CI, that means, those who are not classified as politicians. The main 
difference between the groups is that,	unlike the BE, the members of the SS and CI groups 
lack general management expertise (Markarian and Parbonetti, 2007). 
To avoid biased results and based largely on previous empirical literature, we 
include the following control variables.  
Board size (BDSIZE) is measured as the total number of directors on board 
(Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Jizi 2017; García-Meca and Pucheta-Martínez, 2017). 
Since boards are responsible for encouraging CSR disclosure (Li et al., 2010), a larger 
board size is more desirable because it allows board members with more opportunities to 
connect with external knowledge, skills and networks (Rhee and Lee, 2008), encouraging 
the communication of CSR information (Jizi, 2017).  
Firm size (SIZE) is calculated as the logarithm of the total assets (Sotorrío and 
Sánchez, 2010; Martínez-Ferrero, Garcia-Sanchez and Cuadrado-Ballesteros, 2015). The 
company size is expected to have a significant impact on CSR reporting, due to the fact 
that larger companies are required to disclose more social, economic and environmental 
information than the smaller ones in order to satisfy stakeholders’ needs (Cooke, 1991). 
Moreover, since the preparation and disclosure of this information is costly, larger 
companies may have more resources and expertise to produce and disclose CSR 
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information than the medium and small firms, which improve their image and reputation 
(Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán, 2010). 
Ownership concentration (OWNERSHIP) is measured by the percentage of shares 
controlled by the largest and second largest shareholders. Previous literature finds a 
negative relationship between the power of the largest shareholders and CSR disclosure 
(López-Iturriaga and López-de-Foronda, 2011; Prencipe, 2004). Those companies with a 
more disperse ownership suffer a higher pressure for voluntary disclosure (Cullen and 
Christopher, 2002) and, consequently, they are more prone to suffer an opportunistic 
behaviour and conflict of interests between the agent and the principal. 
Ceo power (CEO_power) is represented as the sum of the following standardized 
variables: (1) CEO duality, (2) the ratio of directors appointed after the CEO began his 
tenure to the total number of directors, (3) the ratio of shares held by the CEO to director 
ownership (Haynes and Hillman, 2010; Chen, 2014). Previous literature suggests that 
CEO power can affect CSR disclosure in a positive (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012) or 
negative (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) way. While Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) 
consider that CEO power provokes a strong power base, which can reduce the board´s 
ability to exercise effective control and reduce their involvement in CSR disclosure, 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) point out that powerful CEOs have incentives to promote 
CSR-related strategies and to press directors to enhance profitable sustainability strategies 
and transparency in its disclosure, stating a positive relationship.  
Profitability is measured by using the return on assets (ROA) and it is calculated 
as the earnings before tax divided by total assets. In spite of the fact that some studies 
have found a negative relationship between profitability and the extent of their CRS 
disclosure (García-Ayuso and Larrinaga, 2003; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Stanny and 
Ely, 2008), most of previous literature confirms a positive relationship between them 
(Wallace et al., 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Raffournier, 1995).  
Leverage (LEV) is measured as total debt over assets (Michelon and Parbonetti, 
2012). Previous empirical evidence is not conclusive. On the one hand, some studies find 
a positive relationship between the reporting of CSR matters and highly leveraged firms 
(Xiao et al., 2004; García-Meca and Pucheta-Martínez, 2017; Clarkson et al. 2008), 
because these companies are more prone to disclose voluntary information in order to 
reduce their agency costs and, therefore, their cost of capital. On the other hand, some 
studies show a negative relationship between both variables by arguing that more 
leveraged companies have fewer opportunities to allocate funds for CSR activities (Jizi, 
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2017). Other studies, have not found a statistically significant relation between the 
previous variables (Gul and Leung, 2004). 
In order to measure the level or quality of firms’ governance, we calculate an 
aggregate index that incorporates several characteristics of the functioning and structure 
of the board of directors (Lara, Osma and Penalva, 2007). This index is the sum of the 
following standardized variables: (1) number of board meetings, since it is perceived that 
more effective boards are those which are more monitored and controlled by their 
directors; (2) existence of an audit committee that involves increased control and 
monitoring exerted by directors, which can entail into increased quality and transparency 
of financial statements (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003). It is measured as a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if the company has an audit committee and 0, otherwise; (3) 
existence of a nomination committee, which guarantees the efficiency of independent 
board members and act as CEO monitors. It is measured as a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the company has a nomination committee and 0, otherwise; (4) lack of an 
executive committee, that although at first sight may appear to be related to better 
corporate governance, the Olivencia Report (1998) points out that this committee assumes 
a key role in decision making, lowering the importance of having independent directors, 
which is a signal of bad governance. This variable takes the value of 1 if the firm does 
not have an executive committee (reflecting good governance) and 0, otherwise; finally, 
(5) since the Olivencia Report notes that the ideal number of directors is between 5 and 
15 directors and following García-Lara et al. (2007), the last variable is measured as a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 (good governance) if there are less than 16 directors 
on the board and 0, otherwise. Higher values of the index are related to stronger 
governance. After creating the index, we construct a dummy variable 
(STRONG_WEAK_BOARD) that takes the value 1 if the aggregate index is greater than 
or equal to the median value, indicating strong corporate governance, and 0 otherwise, 
indicating weak corporate governance. According to Gompers et al. (2003), Davila and 
Penalva (2006) and García-Lara et al. (2007), the use of this kind of indexes, which 
aggregate several governance measures, provides a way of classifying firms considering 
the strength of their governance more successfully. It shows the importance about the 
links between a company’s CSR and the related board attributes. According to Helfaya 




The IBEX-35 is the benchmark stock market index of the Spanish capital markets, 
which includes the largest 35 Spanish firms quoted in the stock market (Sierra, Zorio and 
García-Benau, 2013). It is included as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company is 
listed on the IBEX-35 index and 0, otherwise (Gallego-Álvarez, García-Sánchez, and 
Rodríguez-Dominguez, 2010; García-Sánchez, 2008). Due to the IBEX 35 Spanish listed 
companies are large companies (Ortiz and Marín, 2014), it is expected a positive 
relationship between the inclusion of the company in the Ibex 35 and CRS disclosure. 
Finally, in order to control for the effect of macroeconomic variables on 
companies’ behaviour, our models include industry and temporal dummies (Miguel, 
Pindado and Torre, 2005). 







Table 1: Variable Definition 
Variables Description 
CSR The dependent variable, is a count variable measured as the sum of a 
maximum of 6 items provided by the company 
BE Proportion of outsiders classified as business experts 
SS Proportion of outsiders classified as support specialists  
CI_pol Proportion of politicians classified as community influential 
CI_others Proportion of outsiders with no political background classified as community influential 
BDSIZE Total number of directors on board 
SIZE Logarithm of total assets 
OWNERSHIP Percentage of shares controlled by the largest and second largest shareholders 
LEV Leverage ratio measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets 
ROA Return on assets measured as the proportion of operate income before taxes divided by the total assets 
CEO_power 
Sum of standardized (1) CEO duality, (2) the ratio of directors appointed 
after the CEO began his tenure to the total number of directors, (3) the ratio 
of shares held by the CEO to director ownership 
STRONG_WEAK_BOARD Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the company has a strong corporate governance and 0 if it has weak one 
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IBEX 35 Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the company is listed on the IBEX-35 index, or 0 if otherwise 
 
3.2.Model and analytical technique 
The relationships proposed in previous hypotheses between the independent 
variables and CSR reporting take the following form: 
CSRit = β0 + β1 %BE it + β2 %SS it + β3 %CI_pol it + β4 %CI_others it + β5 BDSIZE 
it + β6 SIZE it + β7 OWNERSHIP it + β8 LEV it + β9 ROA it + β10 CEO_powerit + β11 
IBEX35 it + β11 STRONG_WEAK_BOARD it + β12 LEV it + ∑ βj INDUSTRY i + ∑ βK 
YEAR t + ƞi + µit  
Since we are working with panel data, it is necessary to consider the individual 
and the time point, represented by i and t, respectively. Furthermore, the error term is 
decomposed into the stochastic error term varying cross-time and cross-section combined 
effect (µit,), and the unobserved time-invariant, firm-specific effect (ƞi), which varies 
among individuals, but is constant over time. 
The dependent variable is a count data variable, so standard regression models are 
not suitable due to the fact that they do not take the discrete nature of the variable 
characteristic into account (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). As a solution, and in order to 
control for endogeneity, we estimate the models by using the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Despite the 
endogeneity problems can also be addressed by using simultaneous equation estimators, 
the choice is based on consistency concerns (Miguel, Pindado and Torre, 2005). GMM is 
more consistent and efficient than others because it also controls for the unobservable 
heterogeneity. It arises because CSR disclosure decision is taken by specific individuals 
within a firm, thus generating a particular behaviour pattern (Martínez-Ferrero and 
García-Sánchez, 2014; Martínez-Ferrero, Ruiz-Cano, and García-Sánchez, 2015). In 
order to test the lack of second-order serial correlation, we apply a serial correlation test 
of order i by using residuals in first differences (m2) (Miguel, Pindado and Torre, 2005; 
Martínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez, 2014). As shown in Tables 4 and 5, this hypothesis 
is always rejected for all our models. Additionally, the Hansen test confirms the suitability 
of the instruments that have been used in the estimation. Wald test is also provided, 








Table 2 presents the mean value, the standard error, and the 25th, 50th, and 75th 
percentiles of the variables. The results confirm that CSR disclosure of the firms, on 
average, is 0.956. Regarding board composition, it is shown that, on average, the largest 
represented group is that of support specialists (SS) (13.956%), followed by business 
experts (BE) (12.0%) and community influentials (CI) (6.1%). Table 3 reports the 
Pearson correlation coefficients. Due to the fact that none of the correlation coefficients 
is high enough (>0.80), we conclude that multicollinearity is not a concern in our analysis. 
As a supplement to the information presented, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test is 
provided. The highest VIF value is 2.03, which is below the tolerance value of 10, 







Table 2: Main Descriptive Statistics 
Mean, standard deviation, and 25, 50 and 75 percentile values of the main variables. Panel A and B show the continuous and dummy variables, respectively. CSR is the 
dependent variable, measured as the sum of a maximum of 6 items provided by the company; BE is the proportion of board members classified as business experts; SS is the 
proportion of board members classified as support specialists; CI_pol is the proportion of politics classified as community influential; CI_others is the proportion of outsiders 
with no political background classified as community influential; ROA is the return on assets measured as the proportion of operate income before taxes divided by the total 
assets; IBEX 35 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is listed on the IBEX-35 index, or 0 otherwise; LEV is the leverage ratio measured as the ratio of total debt to 
total assets; CEO_power is the sum of standardized (1) CEO duality, (2) ratio of directors appointed after the CEO began his tenure to the total number of directors, (3) ratio of 
shares held by the CEO to director ownership; STRONG_WEAK_BOARD is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the company has a strong corporate governance and 0 if it has a 
weak one; OWNERSHIP is the percentage of shares controlled by the largest and second largest shareholders; SIZE measures the company´s size as the logarithm of total 
assets; BDSIZE is the total number of board directors *** Significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% 
         
         
Dependent Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Perc. 25 Perc. 50 Perc. 75 
CSR  763 0.956 1.615 0 5 0 0 1 
Independent Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Perc. 25 Perc. 50 Perc. 75 
BE 730 0.120 0.130 0 0.75 0 0.111 0.2 
SS 731 0.139 0.140 0 1 0 0.111 0.2 
CI_pol 745 0.036 0.059 0 0.4 0 0 0.076 
CI_others 742 0.025 0.052 0 0.4 0 0 0 
BDSIZE 762 10.312 3.647 1 21 8 10 12 
SIZE 763 13.157 1.934 6.673 18.349 11.776 13.055 14.468 
OWNERSHIP 763 0.429 0.268 0 0.996 0.2 0.403 0.646 
LEV 763 0.755 2.766 0 57.459 0.375 0.558 0.735 
ROA 763 0.398 5.141 0 104.826 0.020 0.058 0.120 
CEO_power 763 -0.005 1.618 -1.98 15.05 -0.77 -0.77 1.14 
Dummy variables  % (0) % (1) 
STRONG_WEAK_BOARD 763 51.90 48.10 




Table 3: Correlations Matrix 
Pearson’s correlation matrix. CSR is the dependent variable, measured as the sum of a maximum of 6 items provided by the company; BE is the proportion of board members 
classified as business experts; SS is the proportion of board members classified as support specialists; CI_pol is the proportion of politics classified as community influential; 
CI_others is the proportion of outsiders with no political background classified as community influential; ROA is the return on assets measured as the proportion of operate 
income before taxes divided by the total assets; IBEX 35 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is listed on the IBEX-35 index, or 0 otherwise; LEV is the leverage 
ratio measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets; CEO_power is the sum of standardized (1) CEO duality, (2) ratio of directors appointed after the CEO began his tenure 
to the total number of directors, (3) ratio of shares held by the CEO to director ownership; STRONG_WEAK_BOARD is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the company has a 
strong corporate governance and 0 if it has a weak one; OWNERSHIP is the percentage of shares controlled by the largest and second largest shareholders; SIZE measures 
the company´s size as the logarithm of total assets; BDSIZE is the total number of board directors. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). *** Significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 
10%. 
Panel A: Analysis of pairwise Correlation Coefficients 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. CSR 1             
2. BE 0.131*** 1            
3. SS -0.018 -0.225*** 1           
4. CI_pol 0.193*** 0.030 -0.139*** 1          
5. CI_others 0.130*** 0.050 -0.077** 0.082** 1         
6. CEO_power -0.032 0.011 0.072 0.075** 0.048 1        
7.STRONG_WE
AK_BOARD 0.017 0.102*** -0.008 0.182*** 0.003 0.125*** 1       
8. OWNERSHIP 0.105*** -0.059 -0.108*** 0.014 0.015 -0.120*** -0.0048 1      
9. SIZE 0.626*** 0.130*** -0.157*** 0.259*** 0.186*** 0.032 0.038 0.118*** 1     
10. BDSIZE 0.527*** 0.018 -0.192*** 0.123*** 0.046 -0.104*** -0.071** 0.006 0.649*** 1    
11. ROA -0.033 -0.049 0.010 0.034 -0.026 -0.011 0.052 0.008 -0.019 -0.037 1   
12. LEV -0.037 -0.051 0.035 -0.033 -0.033 0.063* 0.032 -0.063* -0.166* -0.105*** -0.005 1  
13. IBEX 35 0.100*** 0.039 -0.034 -0.000 0.093** 0.053 0.040 0.162*** 0.092** 0.058 -0.017 -0.038 1 
Panel B: Multicollinearity Diagnostics using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 




In Table 4, the estimations for testing our research hypotheses are displayed. To 
test the first hypothesis, Model 1 is provided in column 1, showing that the results 
disagree with our predictions, presenting a negative sign and, as a result, those active or 
retired directors who come from other companies (BE) negatively affect CSR disclosure. 
Therefore, the hypothesis H1 is rejected.  
As shown in the second column of the table, where the results of Model 2 are 
provided, there is a significant positive relationship (p < 0.01) between SS and CSR 
disclosure, indicating that the higher the number of SS on the board, the higher the 
probability of disclosing CSR information. It confirms our second hypothesis and 
supports the theory that, since SS are directors who provide support in areas that demand 
specialized expertise such as law, marketing, and finance, their personal image and social 
reputation can be strongly associated with the evolution of the company. 
Regarding our hypothesis H3a, the results offered in Model 3, where community 
influentials with political ties are explored, are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, 
we note that the influence of those CI with political influence in their background is 
positively associated with CSR disclosure on the overall model. Therefore, Model 5, 
where all the variables are jointly examined, evidences that a greater presence of directors 
on boards with political connections has a negative effect on CSR disclosure, supporting 
H3a.  
According to the results in Model 4, we reject H3b, which predicts that the 
community influential directors without political connections have a positive effect on 
CSR disclosure. 
With regard to control variables, those of IBEX35, return on assets (ROA), 
leverage (LEV), board size (BDSIZE), firm size (SIZE) and strong or weak board 
(STRONG_WEAK_BOARD) present a significant positive sign in all the models, as 
predicted. These results find that large leveraged companies, with big and strong boards, 
as well as firms with high return on assets, have a positive effect on CSR disclosure. On 
the contrary, the remaining control variables have a negative and significant effect upon 







Table 4: Results of the Generalized Method of Moments of the baseline model  
Estimated coefficients (std. error). CSR (t-1) is the first lag of the dependent variable, measured as the 
sum of a maximum of 6 items provided by the company; BE is the proportion of board members 
classified as business experts; SS is the proportion of board members classified as support specialists; 
CI_pol is the proportion of politics classified as community influential; CI_others is the proportion of 
outsiders with no political background classified as community influential; CEO_power is the sum of 
standardized (1) CEO duality, (2) ratio of directors appointed after the CEO began his tenure to the total 
number of directors, (3) ratio of shares held by the CEO to director ownership; 
STRONG_WEAK_BOARD is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the company has a strong corporate 
governance and 0 if it has a weak one OWNERSHIP is the percentage of shares controlled by the largest 
and second largest shareholders; SIZE measures the company´s size as the logarithm of total assets; 
BDSIZE is the total number of directors on the board; ROA is the return on assets measured as the 
proportion of operate income before taxes divided by the total assets; LEV is the leverage ratio measured 
as the ratio of total debt to total assets; IBEX 35 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is listed 
on the IBEX-35 index, or 0 otherwise; Year and industry effect are included to control for possible effects 
on the results; z is a Wald test of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, under the null 
hypothesis of no relationship; m1 m2 are serial correlation tests using residuals in first differences, under 
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation; Hansen is a test of over-identifying restrictions, under the 
null hypothesis of non-correlation between the instruments and the error term; degrees of freedom in 
parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 









BE -0.485** (0.196)    
-0.243* 
(0.135) 
SS  0.996*** (0.214)   
1.196*** 
(0.113) 
CI_pol   -0.363 (0.242)  
-0.840*** 
(0.162) 
CI_others    -0.333 (0.372) 
-0.030 
(0.199) 




















































































Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 










m1 -1.84** -1.87* -1.80* -1.80* -1.87* 
m2 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.04 1.04 




In this section, we use a moderator analysis to determine whether the relationship 
between CSR disclosure and the type of director is moderated by the CEO_power index 
(hypothesis 4). To perform this analysis, the variables corresponding to the multiplicative 
term between the independent variables (BE, SS, CI_pol and CI_others) and the 
moderator variable (DCEO_power) are created. DCEO_power is a dummy variable 
equals to 1 if CEO_power takes a value higher than its mean value and 0, otherwise.  
The results of the GMM regression analyses are presented in Table 5. In Model 1, 
we report the positive effect of the interaction of DCEO_power and BE on CSR 
disclosure. Consistent with Table 4, while the proportion of BE has a negative effect on 
CSR disclosure, the interaction with DCEO_power has a positive and significant effect, 
noting that the negative relationship between the proportion of BE on board and CSR 
disclosure is weaker for firms with powerful CEOs. The results are in line with those 
reported by Gul and Leung (2004), who found a negative influence of the expertise of 
non-executive directors on voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong, as well as a positive 
moderating role of CEO duality.  
The results in Model 2 (Table 5) also confirm that SS directors with specific 
abilities and backgrounds tend to be more sensitive towards social and environmental 
demands and that this effect is even higher under powerful CEOs. With respect to CI_pol 
and CI_others directors, Model 3 (Table 5) shows the interaction of these variables with 
CEO_power, suggesting that the negative effect of community influentials on CSR 
disclosure is so strong that CEOs are not sufficiently powered to compensate their 











Table 5: Results of the Generalized Method of Moments of the extension model 
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Estimated coefficients (std. error). CSR (t-1) is the first lag of the dependent variable, measured as the sum of 
a maximum of 6 items provided by the company; BE is the proportion of board members classified as business 
experts; SS is the proportion of board members classified as support specialists; CI_pol is the proportion of 
politics classified as community influential; CI_others is the proportion of outsiders with no political 
background classified as community influential; ROA is the return on assets measured as the proportion of 
operate income before taxes divided by the total assets; IBEX 35 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company 
is listed on the IBEX-35 index, or 0  otherwise; LEV is the leverage ratio measured as the ratio of total debt to 
total assets; DCEO_power is a dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO_power takes a value higher than its mean 
value and 0 otherwise; STRONG_WEAK_BOARD is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the company has a strong 
corporate governance and 0 if it has a weak one; OWNERSHIP is the percentage of shares controlled by the 
largest and second largest shareholders; SIZE measures the company´s size as the logarithm of total assets; 
BDSIZE is the total number of board directors; Year and industry effect are included to control for possible 
effects on the results; z is a Wald test of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, under the null 
hypothesis of no relationship; m1 m2 are serial correlation tests using residuals in first differences, under the 
null hypothesis of no serial correlation; Hansen is a test of over-identifying restrictions, under the null 
hypothesis of non-correlation between the instruments and the error term; degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 














(0.131)   
0.661*** 
(0.140) 


























(0.203)   
0.825*** 
(0.220) 


















































































Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
z 100700.81*** 27457.50*** 28198.89*** 54094.15*** 108482.07*** 
m1 -1.84* -1.88* -1.87* -1.82* -1.88* 
m2 1.04 1.03 1.06 1.05 1.03 




The robustness of the models has been checked by examining if the prior results 
are sensitive to alternate CSR measurements. To start with, it is important to mention the 
two indexes in which we are based on. On the one hand, we rely on Merco-Responsibility 
and Corporate Governance Index, which has been working since 2000 to measure the 
reputation of the 100 top responsible Spanish companies. On the other hand, the Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) is also used as a proxy variable of CSR. It considers the 
environmental, financial and social behavior of the companies that are committed to 
sustainability and voluntary disclosure good practices (Gallego-Álvarez and Quina-
Custodio, 2016). Using both indexes we have created a new dummy variable assigned a 
value of 1 if the company pertains to the DJSI rank and/or to the Merco-Responsibility 
and Corporate Governance rank, 0 otherwise. The results, not reported for the sake of 
brevity, show that our main results are qualitatively the same, confirming that the negative 
impact of BE and politicians, the positive influence of SS directors and the neutral impact 
of other community influential on CSR, are independent of the CSR measure. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
Overall, the empirical evidence of this study supports the view that firms should 
highlight the unique capabilities of directors in order to better understand how board 
composition impacts on CSR reporting. In particular, our results allow us to confirm the 
significant role of directors categorized as support specialists as well as the hypothesis 
that these directors have specific qualifications, abilities and technical knowledge that 
increase their feeling in the direction of society and stakeholders’ interest, which results 
in a higher engagement and commitment with CSR disclosure. Our results are in line with 
previous literature (e.g. Francis et al., 2015; Gray and Nowland, 2017) that has noted that 
specialized directors on boards provide benefits and positive outcomes to firms.  
In addition, the findings evidence a negative effect of political board connections 
on CSR reporting, what supports the view that community influential directors with 
political ties may be interested in achieving their own aims by using political resources 
to the detriment of shareholders’ and stakeholders’ needs. These results are in line with 
previous literature (e.g. Bona-Sánchez et al., 2014; Chaney et al., 2011), which has 
suggested that these directors may have a detrimental effect on firm transparency due to 
their interests on safeguarding their reputation within the company against public scrutiny 
and protecting their political connections. In summary, our results suggest that when firms 
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are interested in increasing CSR disclosure as a potential firm strategy, they should 
consider the industry-specific knowledge and technical skills more than the professional 
experience or political networks of potential new board members. 
This paper also supports the theories that appeal for analysing the multiple 
configurations of corporate governance mechanisms by adopting a “holistic approach” 
and the need to combine them in order to analyse their impact on CSR behaviour. In 
particular, our findings note that support specialists directors tend to be more sensitive 
towards social and environmental demands under powerful CEOs. In addition, the 
expected positive effect of business experts on CSR only happens under powerful CEOs. 
Overall, these findings confirm that the non-monetary CEO incentives related to career 
concerns, reputation, entrenchment and power only have a positive influence on the 
attitude towards CSR commitment with business expert and support specialist directors. 
On the other hand, the results also show that the negative effect of political directors on 
CSR disclosure does not change under firms with powerful CEOs. 
As practical implications, these results confirm the recent calls for appointing 
more board members with specific knowledge and technical qualifications. These 
requests have been more popular after the recent governance scandals and criticisms over 
opacity and lack of transparency in social and environmental activities. Our results also 
have relevant implications for policy makers, since the recent international 
recommendations call for a more professional boardroom of directors to ensure the board 
understanding of the firm’s financial aims, the difficulties of global markets, and the 
consequences of the business on different stakeholders (European Commission, 2011). In 
addition, our findings provide relevant implications for countries where politically 
connected boards are prevalent. In these countries, regulatory authorities interested in 
increasing transparency should recommend the need to report board political connections 
in governance reports as this information can condition CSR reporting. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The objective of this paper has been to study the influence of human and social 
board capital on CSR disclosure of Spanish companies. Following the Hillman et al. 
(2000) taxonomy of board members, we have classified outside directors as business 
experts, support specialists, political directors and other community influentials, and have 
examined whether business, technical expertise or political ties in the boardroom affect 
CSR disclosure. For a sample comprising 152 non-financial listed firms on the Spanish 
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stock market during the 2008–2014 period, and after applying several regressions for 
panel data, this paper provides the following evidence. First, outside directors classified 
as support specialists increase transparency in CSR reporting. Their specific skills and 
technical knowledge could justify their positive impact on strategic firm decisions related 
to CSR reporting, as well as their major qualifications to advise and manage 
environmental risks related to environmental fines or litigation costs. Second, the findings 
show that those directors with political connections negatively impact on CSR reporting. 
These results are in line with previous literature which has hold that these directors may 
be interested in achieving their own aims to the detriment of stakeholders’ needs and 
reduce firm transparency in order to safeguard their reputation and to protect their 
political connections. Finally, our results confirm the effect of powerful CEOs in affecting 
the association between board composition and CSR disclosure. Nevertheless, the 
findings show that the negative effect of political directors on CSR disclosure remains 
unchanged under firms with powerful CEOs.  
As main limitations of the research, we must remark the use of our proxy of CSR. 
Although we believe this measure to be reliable – following previous studies, e.g., García-
Meca and Pucheta (2017) - we are cautious about the possible bias included in it, because 
the final assessment is conditioned by the person who processes the information. 
Nevertheless, we must say that our results are robust to alternative proxies of CSR based 
on Merco and Dow Jones Sustainability rankings. Another limitation is the classification 
of outside directors among business experts, support specialists and community 
influentials, which has been based on the biographical information available. As future 
research, more evidence examining the implications, motivations and effects of these 
categories of directors on firm outcomes (e.g. innovation policies or risk strategy, etc) 
should be useful to better understand the role of these directors in the governance and 
reporting strategies of companies. In addition, we recommend researchers to explore our 
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